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Article  
 
Biopolitics and the Enemy:  
On Law, Rights and Proper Subjects 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the operation of ‘enmity’ in right to die legal appeals. The paper asks: (1) 
why does the law rely on articulations of enmity to rationalize its decisions and (2) what might 
this tell us about how biopolitics operates in the contemporary neoliberal moment? Drawing on 
the insight of Roberto Esposito the paper makes three key points. First, it notes that biopolitics 
operating in the contemporary neoliberal moment is increasingly focused on closures around 
individual human subjects, or what Esposito calls mechanisms of ‘immunization.’ Second, it 
notes that discourses of enmity are perpetuated through legal right to die appeals that shore up 
these immunity mechanisms, which can partly explain why right to die claims fail on appeal. 
Finally, it considers more affirmative ways forward in both theory and practice relating to legal 
right to die appeals. 
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I. Introduction 
In his insightful account of reproductive rights in Italy, Patrick Hanafin detailed the tenuous 
grounds upon which Italian law dealt with the question of the legal status of the embryo. A 
significant question he raised was how Italy, which considers itself a nominally liberal pluralist 
state, has negotiated its Catholic culturalist underpinnings within its legal structure. One 
	 2	
particularly contentious issue in relation to this question was the passing of a new act in 2004 
that would regulate assisted reproductive technology (ART). This act stipulated, quite contrary to 
the Constitution of the Italian Republic, that the embryo had legal rights (to life and to 
protection) independently of the mother. Hanafin noted that the Catholic Church played a 
significant role in shaping this act, whereby it employed the embryo by way of various tactical 
biopolitical maneuverings “as a weapon in the war” against what it called a “culture of death.”1 
Most interesting for the present discussion was the notion that this act, which was grounded on 
the basis of a ‘politics of life’ and a ‘war against death,’ established not only the embryo as a 
sovereign entity—or indeed, a ‘potential’ sovereign—but also established this sovereign status 
by constituting the mother as a necessary enemy of this ‘embryonic sovereign.’ The mother was 
thus conceived as a monstrous other who threatened the embryo’s life.2 
 This particular example that Hanafin points to is not in isolation. As this paper argues, 
enmity also figures as a central articulation in the rationalization of what have colloquially been 
termed ‘right to die’ legal appeals. In particular, this paper focuses on how enmity emerges as a 
key discourse within legal cases concerning the right to die. In dealing with this uptake of enmity 
the paper asks: why does the law generate or, moreover, rely on articulations of enmity in its 
rationale regarding life and death decisions? Further, and more broadly, it asks: what might this 
discourse of enmity tell us about how biopolitics—that is, a ‘politics of life’ – operates in the 
contemporary moment? This latter question is particularly pertinent given that it was Foucault 
who claimed that biopolitics was no longer bound to adversarial relations underscored by enmity, 
but was rather bound to a construction of ‘threat’ leveled at the ‘population’ as species.3 
Responding to these questions, the paper makes the following key assertions. First, it provides a 
brief overview of the relationship between biopolitics and legal ‘rights’ appeals. It suggests that 
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we are in a new era of biopolitics that is decidedly ‘neoliberal,’ illustrated by way of 
contemporary rights appeals to liberal autonomy in relation to the biological body. The paper 
notes that we must be cautious in advocating for these types of rights appeals because they 
invariably imitate neoliberal norms of self-governance, whereby freedom comes to be associated 
with personal or private choice. This is problematic because such self-governance is often 
articulated on the basis of a defensive and closed relationship between self and other, grounded 
in enmity. The paper then suggests that we can turn to what Roberto Esposito calls the 
‘immunization paradigm.’4 The paper notes how Esposito’s framework of immunity provides us 
with the conceptual tools to reconcile the necessary embeddedness of enmity within a neoliberal 
variation of biopolitics that is intensified through a closing off of subjects from one another. It 
argues for the importance of recognizing the operation of enmity as a necessary discourse that is 
constituted through law and legal decisions in order to enunciate a contemporary neoliberal 
political rationality that serves to divide subjects from one another, doing what the New York 
Task Force on Assisted Dying called the shoring up of the ‘limits of human relationships.’5 In 
this discussion of the centrality of enmity, the paper also emphasizes the necessity of its 
associated discourse, vulnerability. Both enmity and vulnerability are articulated in legal 
decisions on assisted dying appeals in such a way as to fix particular subjects of law and affirm 
law’s decisions on the need to protect or immunize subjects from one another. In discussing this 
immunization paradigm the paper also explains how enmity is a defining feature of 
immunization that constitutes ‘proper’ subjects. The paper draws on Hanafin’s example of the 
embryonic sovereign in association with examples embedded in right to die legal cases to show 
how this relationship between enmity, immunity, and the ‘proper’ occurs, and to what effect. 
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Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting a way forward through a discussion of Esposito’s 
affirmative biopolitics in association with his notion of the ‘improper.’ 
 
II. Rights, Biopolitics, Selves 
While we may not be beyond biopolitics we certainly do appear to be in a new era of the 
biopolitical. According to Foucault, biopolitics emerged as a political rationality attached to 
liberalism that was focused on protecting and cultivating life; it was not strictly concerned with 
managing individuals as disciplinary technologies were, but was instead concerned with 
managing the population as “general phenomena” and intervening in this “generality.”6 Despite 
this insight into the operation of biopolitics, in the contemporary moment it appears that this 
focus primarily on the way biopolitics operates at the level of the species is not adequate to 
explain how life is governed.7 One example of new forms of governance is the emerging sphere 
of rights claims in relation to the biological body. Although legal discussions concerning the 
beginning and end of life are not new per se, something appeared to be set in motion circa the 
1970s that incited a different approach to these discussions. For instance, the inaugural 1973 case 
in the United States of Roe V Wade established precedent regarding the liberal feminist right to 
privacy, invoked in debates opposing the broader ‘right to life’ movement,8 and the 1976 US 
case of Karen Ann Quinlan spurred debates concerning what is now colloquially termed ‘the 
right to die.’9  In his discussion of euthanasia in the United States, Shai Lavi refers to this new 
era as a “regulatory-rights-regime,”10 which is informed, in part, by an emphasis on legal claims 
to liberal autonomy in relation to the biological body.11  
Other scholars have also endeavored to theorize this relationship between the biological 
body and claims to liberal autonomy in law. Nikolas Rose, for example, has drawn on Foucault’s 
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account of biopolitics and its underpinning political rationality of liberalism, alongside 
Foucault’s later work on technologies of the self. Rose has argued that the claiming of rights in 
relation to the body can be regarded as instances of ‘self-stylization’ that are brought in line with 
broader governance objectives. This type of self-stylization presents us with new ways of 
considering how persons turn themselves into subjects of rights.12 Rose has also taken this 
analysis further and has noted with his colleague, Carlos Novas, that through practices of self-
governance subjects can turn themselves into ‘biological citizens;’ the biological body can 
become an avenue to claim legal citizenship rights and forge new subjectivities.13 For Rose, the 
appearance of new subjectivities in relation to the biological body points to a shift away from 
techniques of discipline and biopolitics toward new techniques of individualization and 
responsibilization. He calls this a newly emerging ‘ethopolitics.’14 According to Rose, while 
Foucault’s thesis on biopolitics “…implied a separation between those who calculate and 
exercise power and those who were its subjects,” we can see a democratization of biopolitics 
throughout the twentieth century whereby we witness an alliance forged between “political” and 
“personal” aspirations.15 Since ethopolitics has merged with biopolitics in the twenty-first 
century, Rose then argues that we have found ourselves in an era whereby governance objectives 
have emphasised the encouragement of individual self governance. As Rose writes of 
ethopolitics:  
…life itself, as it is lived in its everyday manifestations, is the object of adjudication. If 
discipline individualizes and normalizes, and biopower collectivizes and socializes, 
ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human beings should judge 
themselves and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they are.16 
Others have pointed to the affirmative potential in these self-stylizing techniques that are 
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indicative of ethical ‘care of the self’ practices that Foucault had broached in his later work.17 
Hanafin, for instance, acknowledges the ethical potential found in self-stylizing practices in legal 
claims concerning the right to access reproductive technologies. He notes how ‘micropolitics,’ 
(which he associates with an affirmative kind of ethopolitics) foregrounds the material body and 
allows the individual to “take responsibility for her own autonomous self and works on the 
political terrain to bring about real political change.”18  
Despite this optimism, some scholars have broached ethopolitics with more caution, 
noting the potential for ethopolitical practices of ‘self-care’ to ultimately replicate internalized 
‘neoliberal’ norms.19 These critics suggest that practices of autonomy have a tendency to 
reproduce the neoliberal imperative to stake ownership of, and responsibility over, one’s body. 
As McNay notes, these neoliberal practices reorient social relations around enterprise and are 
highly contentious: “The orchestration of individual existence as enterprise atomizes our 
understanding of social relations, eroding collective values and intersubjective bonds of duty and 
care at all levels of society.”20 Timothy Campbell is also particularly skeptical and critical of 
what he calls a “neoliberal entrepreneurship of the self.”21 Similar to McNay, he notes the 
potential for this type of self-stylization to replicate insidious neoliberal tendencies of autonomy, 
individual agency, and self-responsibility. The danger lies precisely in the moment that 
biopolitical thought does “the dirty intellectual work of neoliberalism,” he argues.22 This occurs 
when ‘ethical’ practices are associated with autonomous ‘selves’ operating as subjects of 
neoliberal biopolitical norms. Thus, it is problematic when we consider the way an individual is 
“harvesting” his or her own biopower23 as a process of ‘becoming bios’ (or turning himself or 
herself into a political subject), without considering how this is often articulated on the basis of 
“a defense of the self and its borders” rather than “as an opening toward the relational.”24  
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It is this latter part of Campbell’s argument that is most convincing for the argument 
presented in this paper. It is convincing and insightful because it pushes us to consider the tenets 
upon which we are critical of conceptual accounts like ethopolitics. It is not that the articulation 
of an affirmative biopolitics, such as that which Rose or Hanafin purports, is impossible; rather, 
what is important is that we consider how this affirmative biopolitics is articulated. That is, we 
must be cautious in considering what this affirmative biopolitics attempts to do politically that 
might potentially reconfigure borders around the self and replicate insidious neoliberal 
tendencies that Campbell and McNay prudently note. In the same instance, we must also 
consider instead how we might conceptualize a politics that errs on the side of relationality and 
openness. Reflecting on the tenets of our critical responses is also important because it ensures 
we tread cautiously in advocating for an outright dismissal of ‘rights’ since this, too, is not 
always affirmative. Consider, for instance, Hanafin’s concerns regarding the way that a dismissal 
of rights might be used for more conservative purposes. He argues that a critique of liberal rights 
sometimes gets attached to a critique of neoliberalism in order to affirm other draconian, 
dogmatic arguments that ultimately conceptualize a politics based on a different idea of the 
‘good’ or ‘truth.’ This dismissal of liberal rights was made effectively in Italy by the then-
Cardinal, now-Pope Ratzinger, who declared that liberal rights were mere reflections of egoistic 
neoliberal desires of self-determining women, which he argued overshadowed the truly 
sanctified notion of life that he sought to appeal for by way of the embryo’s legal protection. In 
this instance an attack on liberal rights was made as part of the Catholic Church’s ‘war against 
death.’ This type of response by Ratzinger is highly problematic because it challenges rights 
claims on the basis of an appeal to a divergent account of a ‘proper’ way of living; Ratzinger’s 
declaration of the Church’s war on death and the promotion of embryonic right to life was 
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merely another reification of this same problem of rights. From his vantage the liberal rights 
appeal was articulated on the basis of desire, in contrast to the Catholic rights appeal that was 
articulated on the basis of a Truth claim. The distinction between desire and truth, and the moral 
weighting of the latter over the former, thus legitimated, from his perspective, the protection of 
the defensive borders around the potential person: the embryonic sovereign. We must be 
cautious, therefore, in considering how politics—that is, both liberal political appeals to ‘rights’ 
that reify what we might call ‘proper’ politics, as well as the conservative dismissals of liberal 
rights—affirm their political posturing on the basis of closures, which thereby reaffirm borders 
around the self that impede more relational ways of conceiving of life and politics. It is this 
relation between the defense of subjects, law, and rights that is of principal concern for this 
paper.  
One of the fundamental issues when attempting to articulate an affirmative biopolitics 
that might need to break with ethopolitics or other accounts that close off around defensive 
articulations of the self as Campbell had suggested is to pay attention to the centrality of 
relationality and community. As will become clearer throughout this paper, it is this defense of 
the self that proliferates the active constitution of enmity in bioethics and the law. We can call 
again on Hanafin’s account by way of example to note that, while he does invoke the notion of 
the ‘responsible,’ ‘autonomous’ self as part of an affirmative biopolitics, elsewhere in his 
analysis he clearly makes the case that his description of ethopolitics refers to ‘difference’ and 
emphasizes ‘disruption.’25 Without this clarification, we might envisage how this type of 
ethopolitical practice could easily cause a slippage and, instead, perhaps inadvertently, do the 
bidding of neoliberalism in the safeguarding of defensive borders around the self. The more 
important issue at hand is thus how the invocation of rights – and other articulations of the 
	 9	
‘proper’ – lends itself to a closing off of the subject. When this subject is considered one that is 
‘closed’ or ‘proper’ it is necessarily conceived as thus on the basis of enmity.  
This distinction between a self enclosed by defensive borders, and a relational or 
communal self as opening outward, is found in the work of Italian philosopher, Roberto 
Esposito. Arguably, Esposito gives us an insightful theoretical toolbox with which to unpack 
some of these complexities regarding the relationship between neoliberal appeals to selfhood 
articulated through rights, the biopolitical emphasis on life in relation to law, and the very ways 
that ‘rights-regimes’ close off the self from its relations to and with others. In this sense, 
Esposito’s paradigm of immunization helps us explore the challenges that we are presented with 
when the subject is constituted as a ‘self’ – that is, as a self-referential sovereignty—which, as 
this paper argues, occurs through the creation of the constitutive ‘enemy.’ 
 
III. Esposito, Immunization and Enmity 
Esposito’s account of biopolitics is indebted to Foucault’s. He praises Foucault’s ‘bio-historical’ 
approach to life, which removes life from a deterministic theoretical framework and allows us to 
conceptualize how political rationalities of governance can manipulate, mould, and shape life.26 
In this regard, Esposito suggests that: “life as such doesn’t belong either to the order of nature or 
to that of history. It cannot simply be ontologized, nor completely historicized, but is inscribed in 
the moving margin of their intersection and their tension.”27 Despite this agreement with 
Foucault, Esposito relentlessly moves beyond him. In particular, one of his main grievances is 
the historico-political distinction Foucault makes between sovereignty and biopolitics. For 
Esposito, these two modes of governance—sovereignty and biopolitics—are better understood 
when reconciled in one paradigm, which he calls ‘the paradigm of immunization.’28  
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According to Esposito, the paradigm of immunization can be traced to the Latin root 
word munus, which immunity shares with its coterminous concept, community. Esposito notes 
that the munus is understood as an obligation to gift-give, which is fundamental to the heart of 
community. The munus is therefore an expropriative demand: it is a “gift that one gives, but not 
that one receives.”29 One might draw a parallel here to Derrida’s notion of the gift, which he 
understands as an impossible kind of giving.30 Functioning at the same time as this expropriative 
demand of gift giving is an exemption from giving, in the form of immunity. Thus, Esposito 
notes, immune is he or she who is exempt from giving. This exemption from giving was seen as 
a protective endeavor to safeguard the individual from the expropriating demands of community.  
From Esposito’s perspective, ‘biopolitics,’ or the deep association between politics and 
life, came about with the rise of immunization, which Esposito claims is what “links the sphere 
of life with that of law.”31 Life and politics each only have meaning on the basis of their 
interrelation.32 While Esposito notes that protective mechanisms over life had been employed for 
centuries, and therefore this idea of protection was nothing new per se, he argues that immunity 
gave rise to modernity when protection was torn from the realm of transcendence (e.g., religion) 
and made artificial: immunity thus emerged when there was a need for a ‘prosthetic’ mechanism 
of defence against risk.33 One such artificial mechanism was, according to Esposito, sovereignty. 
Far from sovereignty’s originary function being a power of ‘making die,’34 Esposito notes that it 
was a protective endeavor: it was a contract forged through the desire for a dispensation from 
immanent threat to individual life. It is for this reason that Esposito states that sovereignty was 
“the first and most influential [immune mechanism] that the biopolitical regime assumes.”35  
As Esposito posits, sovereignty also arose alongside the associated immunity 
mechanisms of personhood and liberty. Thus, through concepts like personhood, property, and 
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rights, sovereignty politics is very much internal to a politics of life. Campbell neatly 
summarizes this in his introduction to Esposito’s Bios, stating: “Sovereignty doesn’t transcend 
biopolitics but rather is immanent to the workings of the immunitary mechanism that he 
[Esposito] sees driving all forms of modern biopolitics.”36 We might add to this account that, 
where liberalism is one mode of immunization that tightens its protective enclaves around the 
subject of rights, neoliberalism in its contemporary form appears to further tighten these 
protective barriers. Thus, we are not merely in an era of ethopolitics that can explain how 
persons turn themselves into self-responsible and individualized subjects according to broader 
rationales of governance in the name of a ‘politics of life’; rather, these practices of 
subjectivization are deeply embedded in the same logic that binds all political modes of life’s 
protection together through immunization. It is important to note here that Esposito’s 
reconciliation of these two modes of governance does not seek to collapse their contextual 
specificity; rather, Esposito’s point is to suggest that both biopolitics and sovereignty share a 
similar goal or political orientation, which is to emphasize the preservation of individual life. In 
the contemporary neoliberal era, in which we have moved into a new terrain of rights discourses 
focused on the individual body or what Lavi called ‘regulatory-rights-regimes’ and others called 
ethopolitics, arguably we witness an intensification of immunization mechanisms. This is not to 
suggest that neoliberalism is essentially dissimilar to other forms of immunization, but rather that 
it is an extension and proliferation of immune mechanisms that operate on the basis of the 
closure of individual life or what Campbell had called an increase in the defensive borders 
around the subject. As Campbell has noted, for instance, neoliberalism in its increasing emphasis 
on privatization and individualization signals a crisis of the current moment, a tightening and 
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intensification of immunity.37 Esposito, too, notes what he regards as a “substantial growth in 
immunization” in the contemporary neoliberal era.38  
In Foucault’s account of the neoliberal individual as a biopolitical subject, the 
‘entrepreneurial self’ that emerges39 is one that is deeply embedded in an immunity mechanism. 
Increased privatization, modes of self-responsibility, and the push for autonomy and 
independence are all indicative of the growing demands on the subject to be self-sufficient and 
entirely immunized from the other. Neoliberal rationalities of governance encourage the taking 
care of, and ‘protection’ of, one’s self and one’s interests. Moreover, it is also often a 
disadvantage or a direct risk to help one’s neighbor given that the self is positioned in direct 
competition to this neighbor who is considered the ‘other.’ In this regard, immunization helps us 
conceptualize how neoliberalism increasingly sets up borders between the self and other such 
that we become isolated selves. As Todd May notes in his critical reflections on neoliberalism, it 
shapes social relations by fostering a negative anthropology of humanity. May argues that a 
neoliberal governmentality attempts to reify the idea that human nature is economic and 
calculative, which influences how we are able to relate to one another. This is not a natural 
condition of humanity—indeed it is one that May wants to rectify through new discourses of 
friendship and trust— but rather it is one that is perpetuated in our current neoliberal condition as 
a truth of the ‘nature’ of the human condition and in that contextual sense it places limits on the 
kinds of social relationships that we can forge.40 Indeed as Esposito notes, one of the problems 
with the immunization of life is precisely that when law imposes modes of immunization of 
individual life, which it does so by articulating discourses that enunciate truths about subjects 
that “shore up the limits of human relations,” as the New York Task Force on Assisted Dying 
had so astutely noted, it closes life off to other possibilities and ways of being.41 For Esposito 
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this closure of life does not simply confine life to particular norms; it also always risks the 
prospect of life itself. Thus, while immunity, as noted, presents itself as a protective endeavor, 
Esposito also notes the dangers associated with immunization. He suggests that, at a certain point 
in its protective endeavors—as we see in this instance of neoliberalism and individualism—
immunization also resultantly closes us off from relations with the other. In its attempt to curb 
the expropriating demands of the munus, immunization mechanisms became ‘appropriating:’ 
they forge something ‘proper’. As Esposito notes, in the process of immunizing us from the 
demands of what is common, we instead start to appropriate this common and, in doing so, begin 
to communicate what is properly one’s own. In the name of life’s protection, immunization has 
led us to forge new relations to one another that are grounded in a mechanism that closes us off 
and secures us from one another. Arguably, as indicated, we increasingly see this separation of 
the self and other through this type of neoliberal rhetoric. We might suggest here that those 
scholars such as Christopher Lasch and Robert Putnam, who have written about the culture of the 
individual, were speaking to the very problematic features of the immunization paradigm.42  
Esposito describes this intimate relation between protection and the constitution of the 
proper by way of the example of sovereignty. He notes that, when we are brought into ‘unity’ 
with one another under the sovereign contract (and we can extend this to the Foucaultian 
biopolitical equivalent of ‘unity’ – that is, the mechanism of ‘population’ or ‘species’ 
management), we are not brought into relation as friends, but instead remain enemies. In being 
brought together in unity under the immune mechanism, we are held in a certain non-relation. 
Thus, he writes: 
The relation that unites men [through immunization] does not pass between friend and 
enemy and not even between enemy and friend, but between enemy and enemy, given 
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that every temporary friendship is instrumental…with regard to managing the only social 
bond possible, namely enmity.43 
Here, Esposito means to suggest that the immunity mechanism of sovereignty (and also 
neoliberal biopolitics) did not offer us protection and bring us together as friends in relation to 
one another; that is, immunization did not offer us protection such that we would live in 
relational harmony with one another. Rather, through immunization we are brought into 
“reciprocal dissociation” or a “unity without relation.”44 This is also why Esposito suggests the 
immunization mechanism both totalizes us and divides us from one another. The state of being 
immune that we so ‘enjoy’ to this present day can be summarized by the de Tocquevillian adage 
whereby we live “side by side unconnected by a common tie.”45 Moreover, it is enmity that 
maintains this reciprocally dissociative relation.  
In short, then, immunization is an artificial construct that, through various dispositifs, 
such as personhood, rights, law and so on, closes us off from the other under the auspices of 
trying to protect us from the other who is one’s immanent enemy. Indeed, this notion of the 
enemy is vital to retaining immunity since it rationalizes the very need for protection, and 
therefore legitimates the immunity mechanism itself. Given this centrality of enmity to 
immunization, it is here I want to turn to the way that enmity operates in bioethics right to die 
legal appeals.  
 
IV. Enmity in Assisted Dying 
It is not only in beginning of life decisions as Hanafin had noted in which the discourse of 
enmity emerges in law. In legal cases that appeal to voluntary active euthanasia or physician 
assisted suicide (PAS), war-like relations or theatrical ‘presentations’ of fear as Foucault stated,46 
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are consistently employed to justify immunization mechanisms. For instance, in the recent 2012 
case of Nicklinson V Ministry of Justice, the plaintiff’s appeal to the right to die was rejected 
through this very constitution of enmity.47 Two key examples within this case framed such a 
reading. In one instance, the case drew on precedent set in Re A Conjoined Twins.48 In the case 
of Re A, we were presented with the conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary. The case posed the 
question of whether the twins could be separated, whereby this separation would have inevitably 
‘killed’ one twin in order to save the life of the other. The death of one twin to save the other was 
not rationalized in a biopolitically affirmative manner, for instance on the basis that one life was 
better than no life but, rather, through a pessimistic, indeed adversarial, discourse, whereby one 
twin was articulated as directly threatening the life of her sister, “draining her life blood.”49 In 
addition to the precedent of Re A, Justice Charles Smith of Nicklinson’s case also drew on the 
historical example of the duel, whereby a case was made that asking for the right to die was 
consistent with asking for consent to death through ‘battle.’ By noting the illegality of dueling, 
the case was made that even if one ‘consents’ to death at the hands of an other, this does not 
grant impunity under law for the taking of such life. Again, employing war-like rhetoric did not 
frame the right to die in any light that might allow one to consider it as a compassionate moment 
of being with the other or an openness to otherness. Instead, it necessarily implicated the right to 
die in a discourse of enmity. Even with a compassionate motive and a consensual, indeed, 
pleading individual who is appealing to the other, making themselves absolutely vulnerable and 
willingly so, the person who commits this act is, under law, no less than a murderer.50  
 In Canada’s Sue Rodriguez’s case, many of the same points were raised regarding the 
association between assisted death and murder. The dissenting opinion given by Justice 
McLachlin noted that the opinion of Justice Sopinka had staked its denial of assisted dying in the 
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claim that any “... active participation by one individual in the death of another is intrinsically 
morally and legally wrong.”51 McLachlin noted the argument that “…the prohibition on assisted 
suicide is justified because the state has an interest in absolutely criminalizing any willful act 
which contributes to the death of another.”52 In Nicklinson and Rodriguez’s case, the absolute 
association of the act of taking life with unlawful murder as if this were ‘inevitable’ is curious. In 
the case of the right to die, this appears to occur by framing compassionate killing in the context 
of a criminal act whereby the other is always, inevitably, a ‘murderer’. Indeed, this inevitability 
of judgment lies at the very heart of Esposito’s account of immunization. Deciding on a guilty 
verdict in advance of an act, “regardless of whether the circumstances merit it” is how 
mechanisms of immunizing subjects from one another operate.53 As Esposito further notes: “Life 
is not condemned because it is guilty but in order to make it guilty.”54 If the “stated aim of law is 
to preserve life…life can be preserved only if held in the fold of an inexorable anticipation that 
judges life to be guilty even before any of its acts can be judged.”55 The point here that is central 
to the paper’s thesis is to suggest that the law must create truths about human nature in order to 
judge it as guilty and condemn an act before it has even been performed.  
 Deferring to bellicose examples such as the vampiric twins and dueling in case law when 
dealing with the prospect of assisted dying are two instances in which we see the law operate in 
such a way as to create a groundless fiction about the limits of human relationships that requires 
“shoring up” by reifying a binary between friend and foe. Even within a regime of governance 
that advances the values of liberal individualism – that is, freedom of self-determination, and 
therefore an individual ‘sovereignty over oneself’ of sorts— the law appears to need to cultivate 
the notion that one’s neighbor is to be feared through recourse to the ‘essence’ of human nature 
as wolf-like. Indeed this is the kind of governmental approach to ‘conducting conduct’ that 
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Foucault had noted:56 discourses of enmity are enunciated that perpetuate a particular truth of 
human relationships that rationalizes divisions between subjects on the basis of knowable 
behavioural ‘traits’57 and a particular ‘anthropology’ of humankind.58 The following commentary 
in Nicklinson’s case also makes this clear: 
…recognizing a partial excuse of acting out of compassion would be dangerous. Just as a 
defence of necessity ‘can very simply become a mask for anarchy’, so the concept of 
‘compassion’ – vague in itself— could very easily become a cover for selfish or ignoble 
reasons for killing, not least because people often act out of mixed motives.59  
It was Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt who had also noted this necessary deferral to man’s 
essence in order to legitimate a political mechanism of protection, the latter of whom noted the 
“anthropological basis for political theory” was “a pessimistic anthropology, which has a vision 
of man as bad, corrupt, dangerous, fearful and violent.”60 Derrida has written on this aspect of 
Hobbes and Schmitt’s theorizing, noting how their deferrals to human nature as wolf-like is a 
legitimation of a mechanism of sovereignty that reifies divisions between subjects.61 
Speaking to the prospect of solidarity that might break from the individualizing 
tendencies of immunization more generally and neoliberal immunization more specifically, May 
writes: “Because of the individualizing tendency of neoliberalism we often find it difficult to 
think in terms of solidarity…we don’t possess ways of thinking in terms of solidarity, because 
we are discouraged from thinking these ways.”62 Solidarity is unable to emerge on the very basis 
that borders have been shored up between “the same (of friendship) and the other (of enmity).”63  
Another discourse that emerges in association with enmity in right to die legal appeals is 
that of vulnerability. This discourse emerges most prominently in the recent 2013 case of 
Fleming V Ireland in which Marie Fleming, the appellant, requested an assisted death.64 In this 
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case a symbolic type of enmity was framed through the discourses of ‘burden’ and 
‘vulnerability.’ It is important to establish as background to this case that in 2012 a discussion 
emerged in a Canadian right to die appeal from Gloria Taylor, in which Justice Lynn Smith 
granted a constitutional exemption that allowed Taylor the right to assisted death. Justice Smith 
ruled out the concern that Taylor had internalized a belief that she was a burden on her family, 
and therefore ruled out the argument that this internalized burden would coerce Taylor into 
seeking an assisted death that she might not otherwise have desired.65 It was in direct response to 
Justice Smith’s ruling that Ireland’s Justice Nicholas Kearns provided ‘evidence’ that the threat 
of burden was still an ever-present possibility and, on account of this, dismissed Ireland’s Marie 
Fleming’s appeal to die. The judgment summary notes:  
The evidence from other countries shows that the risks of abuse are all too real and 
cannot be dismissed as speculative or distant. One real risk attending such liberalisation is 
that even with the most rigorous system of legislative checks and safeguards, it would be 
impossible to ensure that the aged, the disabled, the poor, the unwanted, the rejected, the 
lonely, the impulsive, the financially compromised and emotionally vulnerable would not 
avail of this option in order to avoid a sense of being a burden on their family and 
society. The safeguards built into any liberalised system would, furthermore, be 
vulnerable to laxity and complacency and might well prove difficult or even impossible 
to police adequately.66 
Not only was Marie Fleming constituted as vulnerable in this case summary, but also her 
vulnerability was constituted in relation to the conditions of enmity and immunity. Kearns drew 
on the argument that right to die appellants would conceive of themselves as burdens due to the 
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direct pressure they would place on their families and caregivers. To support this claim he drew 
on what one witness, Professor George, called ‘care fatigue’ whereby:  
…as a clinician treating patients in the final stages of their lives I have come across it in 
the most loving family environments. It is easy in such circumstances for seriously ill 
people to feel a sense of obligation to remove themselves from the scene.67 
While the discourse of enmity may not appear to be immediately apparent in this case, it is 
implicit in the rationale through neoliberal discourses of burden and vulnerability. These 
discourses invoke an immunity mechanism bound to a double relation of enmity. On the one 
hand, the statement rationalizes a discourse of self-responsibilization that frames Fleming as a 
burden and ‘enemy’ in the sense that she infringes on the freedom of her loved ones (hence, 
causing them ‘care fatigue’).68 Responsibilization is a typical discourse associated with 
neoliberal governance rationalities that pushes individuals to take care of themselves.69 On the 
other hand, the statement rationalizes the need to protect and immunize Fleming from the 
possibility—indeed, the inevitability—that this care fatigue may lead to a state of tension or a 
‘war’ of the household, thus coercing Fleming into desiring a death out of fear and obligation. In 
a political climate in which care is frequently pushed onto families of individuals to remove the 
burden from the state,70 arguably what is set in motion is new ways that enmity can get 
introduced as a rationale for increased legal ‘protection’ (or ‘immunization’), which penetrates 
law to protect us, even when we do not desire it, from those often deemed most ‘close’ to us: our 
loved ones.  
 Nicklinson’s case also realizes this problematic of vulnerability as it operates alongside 
legal protection from the constitutive enemy who is alleged to deliver harm. As Nicklinson 
clearly says: 
	 20	
By all means protect the vulnerable. By vulnerable I mean those who cannot make decisions 
for themselves just don't include me.  I am not vulnerable, I don’t need help or protection 
from death or those who would help me. If the legal consequences were not so huge i.e. life 
imprisonment, perhaps I could get someone to help me. As things stand, I can’t get help.71  
Writing in the context of restorative justice, socio-legal scholar George Pavlich notes the 
problematic uptake of ethical arguments used to defend certain legal decisions. In the context of 
the discussion of vulnerability this is particularly pertinent as he argues that ethical claims such 
as those said to ‘protect’ the vulnerable “operate in the name of supposedly universal principles 
of harm, or absolute conceptions of general community interests.”72  For him, this assumption is 
damaging because this does not allow us to “seek out ways to envisage entirely new forms of 
social life.”73 It also narrows the very possibilities for considering what indeed constitutes ‘harm’ 
or, in this case, to consider what we imagine by vulnerability. In the instance of right to die 
appeals, this commentary is absolutely germane: one must surely note the ways that a law based 
on an uptake of the discourse of vulnerability that claims to be an ethical universal norm 
reflecting community interests instead does much damage to many members of this community 
who do not subscribe to the same account. Those persons appealing to the right to die like 
Nicklinson certainly do not consider themselves within the same universal context of 
vulnerability, nor do they wish to be considered thus. Indeed, rather than considering themselves 
vulnerable to other persons, whom the law establishes as proper enemies that it claims to protect 
them from, right to die appellants such as Nicklinson instead typically articulate themselves 
vulnerable to the law itself that they claim sentences them to a fate worse than death: life. Not 
only does Nicklinson’s statement give us insight into the problematic that Pavlich has outlined 
above, but also it speaks more specifically to the implications of law acting as a conduit of a 
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neoliberal political rationality that divides subjects from one another. By perpetuating discourses 
that constitute proper types of persons (vulnerable) who inevitably require protection, this 
protection is grounded in a division that sustains and reifies the particular logic of the political 
rationality itself. Despite the relatively different ways enmity is called upon in the cases of 
Nicklinson, Rodriguez, and Fleming, common to the legal discussions is the necessity to 
‘immunize’ and to forge artificial parameters that can be drawn around the self and other. The 
discursive enunciation of the presence of a possible enemy, either a direct enemy or the enemy of 
the community that is pressuring persons to die in particular ways, is necessary to permit and 
indeed constitute ‘legal protection’ as a necessity that sustains a neoliberal governance rationality 
that serves to reinforce appropriative, individualized divisions between subjects. The effect of 
this is that such discourses of enmity and vulnerability shore up the limits of human relationships 
in such a way that they block the prospect of an opening out to alternative ways of being in 
relation to others.  
 On the other side of this divide however we must also ask in what ways the refusal of 
vulnerability (i.e. Nicklinson’s claim that he is not vulnerable) and the depiction of law as a 
mechanism of communal force or violence imposed on subjects is also complicit in another type 
of immunizing function, this time by way of the articulation of legal rights themselves. Judith 
Butler for instance seems to critique the rejection of vulnerability as a way to establish and 
legitimate a violent self-centered subject.74 It is important to bear in mind that she is speaking in 
a very different context to the subject matter in question, and that she is also speaking to a very 
different subject per se (specifically that of the nation as a subject). However, her insights are 
still apt. She writes that the denial of vulnerability (in the context of the nation) is a way to re-
instill boundaries and to erect defensive apparatuses around the subject. In what ways might the 
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rights claims of appellants themselves also be invoking a denial of vulnerability to both shore up 
the enmity of the other – in this case the law itself or the community of persons who seek to deny 
assisted dying  – and also to shore up the subject’s own prospects as a self-directing individual 
sovereign subject? Describing the violent, self-centered subject, Butler notes:  
Its actions constitute the building of a subject that seeks to restore and maintain its 
mastery through the systematic destruction of its multilateral relations ... It shores itself 
up, seeks to reconstitute its imagined wholeness, but only at the price of denying its own 
vulnerability, its dependency, its exposure, where it exploits those very features in others, 
thereby making those features ‘other to’ itself.75 
Indeed, Derrida had also noted a similar point regarding the liberal individual who attempts to 
immunize himself or herself against the violence of the state. He writes, “There are different and 
sometimes antagonistic forms of sovereignty, and it is always in the name of one that one attacks 
the other.76 From the vantage of governmentality, one might note the ways that the subjective 
appeals to the right to die, particularly as they refuse a status of vulnerability, are not simply 
neutral or innocent but also are inscribed in the shared neoliberal political rationality that serves 
to close off the borders around the self. One must therefore consider how such liberal rights 
appeals also, to some degree, endeavor to fix a ‘proper’ subject. In denying vulnerability and 
appropriating a self-directing subjectivity, liberal right to die appeals themselves seem to be 
complicit with the constitution of a subjectivity that is complete, protected and defended from 
the fear and enmity that the other poses.77  
V. War, Immunity and the Proper 
Following Esposito’s political project as well as the insights that Campbell has added, we can 
explain in more detail this critical concern that both scholars hold in terms of the creation of 
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proper subjects that serves to establish us in reciprocal dissociation with one another and 
confines us to the ‘defensive barriers’ that enclose the self. This enclosure, which occurs through 
immunization and is arguably most rife in the contemporary context, is what creates the 
appearance of someone who is ‘proper’; hence, it creates the appearance of the individual 
sovereign subject who appears to be an ‘absolute’ or ‘indivisible’ self. As previously noted, the 
rationale that constitutes this proper subject is articulated through the discourses of enmity and 
vulnerability. In this regard, we can say that neoliberal governance articulates the discourses of 
enmity and vulnerability to legitimate legal decisions that forge a separation between a ‘proper’ 
self and a ‘proper’ other. The establishment of the proper subject is necessary in order for law to 
fix its target and make a decision.78 However, in forging proper subjects of law, which is 
necessary for a legal judgment to be made, the constitution of the ‘proper’ also closes us off to 
the possibility of a relational ethics.79 ‘Otherness’ itself is central to this proper constitution: the 
other must be a ‘proper’ other, which is, ultimately, a ‘known other’. Moreover, this other is 
‘made known’ as an ‘other’ by calling on what is proper to it: its status as an enemy or as a 
vulnerable subject. In the same way that Esposito noted that life must be determined as guilty in 
order to found law itself, we could say the same thing about the way that discourses operate in 
order to already define a particular anthropology of humanity that legitimates legal decisions to 
deny assisted dying. The subject of the right to die—the appellant—must be made known as both 
a vulnerable subject and as an enemy such that he or she can be brought within law’s sphere and 
judged accordingly. Likewise, the subject who would otherwise help the appellant to die must 
also be made known before an act of killing even occurs such that he or she can be labeled and 
judged as guilty. In the cases presented we see how the other or enemy is made known. For 
instance, it was only possible to grant the embryonic sovereign a proper status by making known 
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an enemy that constituted it as a proper subject; it was defined negatively through its relation to 
the mother that gave it a property and that made it a subject. To thwart Nicklinson’s appeal to the 
right to die, a known other, an enemy, had to be created. Even though there was not an enemy 
per se in Nicklinson’s case, an artificial enemy was necessary to rationalize a denial of the 
appeal. Thus, the legal status of ‘murderer’ was called upon to directly constitute the other 
through this ‘known’ lens, without even demanding a performance of the ‘murderous’ act. In this 
regard we can claim that law rationalizes its decisions on denying assisted dying through an 
enunciation of discourses that allow law to fix its gaze by creating proper subjects of law. These 
proper subjects are also individual, immunized subjects who must remain divided from one 
another. Law operates as a conduit of a political rationality of governance that demands that 
human relations are shored up to the extent that all actions can be made known according to 
specific normalized criteria and judged accordingly. Law and legal judgments must continue to 
uphold the differentiation between self and other, and it must hold these two apart through the 
discourses of enmity and vulnerability.      
 Despite this logic that operates through a political rationality of governance, such a logic 
is not a ‘truth’ of human nature per se. The paper has already noted that this is the case. Legal 
decisions on the right to die serve to sediment human relationships as necessarily divided from 
one another by bringing into effect these discourses of enmity and vulnerability. Esposito says 
something similar about the operation of enmity as part of his account of immunization and the 
way that immunization mechanisms close off the self from others. Esposito notes, for instance, 
the ‘mythic’ idea of enmity. This appeal to myth is akin to Derrida’s claim that sovereignty is 
only ever a ‘performance.’80 From Esposito’s vantage, discourses that enunciate political 
rationalities of governance that operate on the basis of the need to divide subjects from one 
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another do so with the goal of presenting these divisions as natural and necessary: they do so 
through the establishment of a war-like division between subjects that is grounded in a defense 
of the individual self, as we have seen articulated in legal cases where the other is articulated as 
an enemy of the self. However, from Esposito’s vantage, much like Foucault’s and Derrida’s, 
such war-like states are governance mechanisms that ‘make known’ the enemy and, as such, rely 
on a static division between self and other.81 He or she who is other (the enemy) can be made 
known, and this known enemy can be defeated. The discourse of enmity makes possible the legal 
rationalization of denying assisted dying by making known the other (as a proper subject), and 
immunizing the subject from this other absolutely: “With the corpses of the enemies removed or 
reused for exercises”, Esposito writes, “…the battlefield has now been cleared. The body has 
regained its integrity: once immunized, it can no longer be attacked by an enemy.”82 However, 
rather than being something that is  “immortal,” and final, as Esposito notes, the process of 
division of subjects and the immunization of subjects from one another is a process embedded 
with “structural aporias.”83 Immunity is not a mechanism of absolute closure, despite invoking 
discourses and dispositifs that make it appear as such; rather, the closing off of the self from 
other that is articulated as a part of human nature within the contemporary context must be read 
from Esposito’s vantage as something that can always, and will always, open back up to the 
prospect of more relational ways of being in common. For Esposito this is so given the intimate 
relation of immunity (or the closure and appropriation of the self) with community that is bound 
to an originary dependency that we share with one another in the munus.  
In his reflections on neoliberalism, communitarian scholar Olssen also notes that a 
neoliberal governmentality has a tendency to forge closures around subjects through the 
constitution of proper human relationships by attempting to promote ideals of “self-
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reliance…responsibilization…and an enterprise culture.”84 However, he notes that this detracts 
from the ways that we are intimately bound together through a shared dependency that at base 
shapes our human relationships. He writes for instance that “…dependency is, in effect, a part of 
interconnectedness, or relationality, by which our lives are defined by our commitments to 
others.”85 Even in the contemporary climate in which we find that governance mechanisms 
endeavor to appropriate or forge divisions between subjects and constitute each subject as proper 
through making one another ‘known’ as a threat or enmity of the other, what Olssen points to, 
and what Esposito also notes, is that this condition is not necessary. Moreover, this condition of 
division, immunization, and the proper can always be reversed to an opening toward other ways 
of being in common that are grounded in ideas of solidarity, community, and mutual 
dependency. This is what Esposito finds in his concept of munus and what this paper poses most 
simply as the interconnectedness of the human condition in which we might find new prospects 
of opening up the defensive borders of the self, and deconstructing them to imagine other ways 
of being.86 For Esposito, once we have revealed the way that this ‘proper’ is forged we can in 
turn critique and deconstruct it. In the constitution of proper subjects, this unpleasant mode of 
‘protection’ unequivocally closes off our relation to the other by defining this other as one’s 
absolute enemy, despite the appeal to this other for help at the end of life. Likewise, one might 
posit in the same vein that creating an artificial mode of protection around an embryo, which 
forges its proper status in opposition to a known enemy that is its mother, is another insidious 
cruelty that disregards the very relationality of life, or the relationality of the ‘subject.’  
This depiction of the operational features of immunity and its creation of the proper 
subject may be used to highlight how immunity does the ‘work’ of conservative discourses that 
frame the mother as an enemy of the fetus, thus rationalizing Christian, Catholic, and right wing 
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beliefs. However, it is important to note that this proper status of the subject is equally used to do 
the work of ‘liberal democratic’ politics, for instance from the vantage of ‘liberal’ right to die 
appeals. In this regard, the constitution of the proper subject has implications for both sides of 
the political debate. The key problem in both cases, as the paper has argued, is the attempt to 
close off relations between subjects through the insistence on immunity and the proper, 
particularly when immunity is conceived through a lexicon of war that utilizes enmity to 
articulate the individual ‘self’ in modern politics. Just as conservative discourses of enmity are 
dangerous, so, too, can liberal democratic discourses slip when they rely on the constitution of 
‘proper’ subjects.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
By understanding how enmity and its coterminous discourse vulnerability operate in such a way 
as to enunciate a neoliberal rationality of politics that shores up limits of human relationships, we 
can also reconsider how to reframe the problem. For instance, in this paper I have noted that 
human relationships are shored up in two ways. The first is through law’s articulation of the 
subject who would help the person die as necessarily an ‘other’ by way of fixing the gaze on 
them as performing an act of murder, without considering other motives for taking life. This 
fixes the appellant as vulnerable and the assister as enemy. The second is through the appellant’s 
‘right’ to die appeal itself, which also does not escape this problematic. The appellant’s 
articulation of the right to die through law, by refusing vulnerability and claiming instead to 
assert self-direction and self sovereignty, also ascribes to the same neoliberal rationality of 
governance that operates on the basis that subjects are able to take care of themselves, be self 
sufficient individual subjects, and therefore conform to the social conditions in which they find 
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themselves shaped as subjects.87 In this sense, one can ask to what extent rights claims also shore 
up the limits of human relationships whereby in appealing to the prospect of assisted dying they 
are also paradoxically asking the law to immunize them. Neither of these positions necessarily 
challenges the conditions of a neoliberal governmentality that divides or immunizes subjects 
from one another; rather, it seems that both positions are fixed within a rationality that continues 
to erect borders around the self and shore up human relational limits. The question then becomes: 
how can we imagine an affirmative politics of assisted dying without relying on discourses of 
enmity that constitute the ‘proper’ subject as he or she in need of protecting from an adversarial 
other? Or, perhaps better put, how can we envisage a more ‘relational’ ethics that notes, and 
works against, the performative features of these utterances of the ‘absolute enemy’ and the 
‘proper’ more broadly conceived?  
As the paper has noted, despite the way that the discourse of enmity is used to fix 
subjects through immunity’s protective enclaves, the ‘other’ who is constituted as this enemy is 
not strictly an ‘other’ but instead is always reciprocally related to us. For Esposito, this kind of 
relational ethic is crucial to an affirmative instance of biopolitics that he wants to salvage. Such a 
relational ethic is one that does not close us off from one another through immunity mechanisms, 
but that puts us ‘outside ourselves,’ back into relation. Drawing on the reciprocity of community 
and immunity, Esposito gestures to a type of ‘contagion’ that might break with the constitution 
of the self. Rather than the threat of the other merely causing us to immunize, instead this threat 
may relate us. In order to think this kind of relational contagion, or “contagion that relates,”88 
Esposito pushes us to consider new ways to relate to one another through difference, or plurality, 
as ‘improper’ subjects. Improper subjects do not share an ‘entity’ or something ‘proper’ in 
common, but rather share the very relationality of being. As Esposito states, it “isn’t the inter of 
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esse but rather esse as inter, not a relationship that shapes being [essere] but being itself as the 
relation.”89 
In the legal appeals discussed this relational contagious experience would not rationalize 
a type of self-stylization in which the individual and autonomous subject turns himself or herself 
into a subject of rights by seeking ‘privacy’ or other immune-bound concepts like ‘dignity’ and 
‘liberty.’ These problematically endeavor to protect the proper subject of rights. Rather, 
Esposito’s affirmative plea would ask us to reconsider the relationality of one’s subject position. 
This type of relational approach would ask the law to respond on the basis of one’s actions as a 
relational subject, as opposed to law responding on the basis of what one ‘is’ as a ‘proper’ 
subject. This might therefore be more akin to the type of politics Hannah Arendt had 
envisaged.90 For instance, we might argue that the use of enmity in legal rationale forecloses a 
number of relational moments by already constituting ‘what’ one is in law, without considering 
‘who’ one is on account of the actions one takes. Right to die cases tell us as much when the law 
has already decided, before any action occurs, that the person who takes the life of another is, 
inevitably, a murderer, even if the action reveals a different characteristic of the subject as 
compassionate and loving. In considering this affirmative biopolitics in such a relational way it 
also helps us note the way that life “evolves” when we open ourselves up to these new relational 
possibilities.91 Thus, Esposito provides us with an ethics that points to a process of ‘becoming 
other,’ or a way that we can open ourselves up to otherness by dissolving the very meaning of 
‘otherness’ into a reciprocal relation with the self.  
To draw to a conclusion, this paper has argued that Esposito’s insight into immunization, 
which brings together sovereignty and biopolitics, is not only revealing of the way that bioethics 
legal cases appear very much bound to the discourse of sovereignty and adversarial relations 
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underscored by enmity, but also suggests that his ‘immunity paradigm’ is absolutely integral to 
appreciating how biopolitics operates in the contemporary neoliberal political climate. Where 
Foucault had noted that enmity was bound with sovereignty, and that the articulation of enmity 
had therefore dissipated in biopolitical modes of governance, arguably through the intimate link 
between biopolitics and contemporary rights claims that reify the proper self we see the re-
articulation of enmity and immunity as a central operational feature of modern neoliberal 
biopower. In particular, reading legal cases through the immunity paradigm helps us comprehend 
how right to die cases appear to fail on appeal because they tend to articulate themselves 
according to a particular narrative of enmity, which is a defining moment in the operation of 
immunity. Moreover, this insight into the immunity mechanism also asks us to carefully question 
those cases we might otherwise consider ‘liberally affirmative’ that give us the outcome we 
might desire, but use the same damaging and potentially closed rationale that is embedded in the 
discourse of their conservative counterparts (for instance, cases that affirm rights on the basis of 
being a liberal individual and private self).  
In making these claims, the paper has further noted that we ought to be careful when 
employing discourses of liberal affirmative theoretical frameworks such as ‘ethopolitics’ without 
considering the ways that they may also close off the self through the same mechanisms of 
immunity when they relate autonomous ‘selves’ to political change. This does not mean that all 
ethopolitical conceptions of politics are problematic. Yet, Esposito’s account of immunity, and 
the ways in which these legal cases appeal to immunization mechanisms underscored by enmity, 
reminds us that the affirmative potential is found more so when biopolitical analyses are 
considered through a lens that is receptive to notions of difference and relationality. This account 
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therefore implores us to tread with caution, to avoid closing off the borders of the self, and 
instead remain open and relational.  	
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